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ABSTRACT 
 
Panchashil Multi-Purpose Co-Operative Limited, a banking company of 
Nepal, commissioned this study. After the end of civil war in Nepal, 
which lasted for ten years, there was a situation of financial crisis. This 
situation was not brought by any economic changes in the country but be-
cause of the bias behaviour of people. 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to use behavioral finance as a tool and 
suggest the commissioning company a way to overcome the situation 
caused by an irrational decision-making behaviour of the investors or the 
company’s customers. 
 
There are many models, theories and hypotheses of behavioral finance de-
fined by prominent researchers. Different researchers have studied human 
behaviour and human decision-making criteria and tried to explain these 
under different supporting models of behaviour finance. Many of such 
models, theories and hypotheses are used in this study. 
 
As a part of the research method, an interview with the management 
committee of the company was arranged. There were also some question-
naires sent to the customers of the company. 
 
Based on the interviews and surveys, it can be said that the behaviour of 
the investors is not rational. Thus, there is a need for proper study of the 
investors in the company and a customer satisfaction assessment should be 
done. Not only that, the investors /customers should be updated with the 
information on the company’s changed policy or schemes or any other 
news that is relevant. 
 
Keywords behaviour, finance, cognitive, bias, psychology  
 
Pages 36 p. + appendices 2 p. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
1	   INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1	  
1.1	   Background ......................................................................................................... 1	  
1.2	   Case company ..................................................................................................... 2	  
1.2.1	   Employees ............................................................................................... 2	  
1.2.2	   Management committee .......................................................................... 3	  
1.2.3	   Target customers ..................................................................................... 3	  
1.2.4	   Product range ........................................................................................... 3	  
1.3	   Research question ................................................................................................ 5	  
1.4	   Purpose ................................................................................................................ 5	  
1.5	   Methods ............................................................................................................... 5	  
2	   THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................ 6	  
2.1	   Definition ............................................................................................................ 6	  
2.2	   Banking legislation of Nepal ............................................................................... 7	  
2.2.1	   The dos .................................................................................................... 7	  
2.2.2	   The don’ts ................................................................................................ 8	  
2.3	   Faulty framing ..................................................................................................... 9	  
2.4	   Hindsight bias ...................................................................................................... 9	  
2.5	   Prospect theory .................................................................................................. 10	  
2.6	   Gambler’s fallacy .............................................................................................. 11	  
2.7	   Herding/crowd ................................................................................................... 11	  
2.8	   Confirmation bias .............................................................................................. 12	  
2.9	   Behavioral critique ............................................................................................ 13	  
2.9.1	   Pride ...................................................................................................... 14	  
2.9.2	   Gluttony ................................................................................................. 15	  
2.9.3	   Lust ........................................................................................................ 17	  
2.9.4	   Envy ...................................................................................................... 18	  
2.9.5	   Avarice .................................................................................................. 19	  
2.9.6	   Sloth ...................................................................................................... 20	  
2.9.7	   Wrath ..................................................................................................... 21	  
3	   RESEARCH .............................................................................................................. 22	  
3.1	   Data collection ................................................................................................... 22	  
3.1.1	   Management interview .......................................................................... 22	  
3.1.2	   Survey with the case company’s customers .......................................... 23	  
3.2	   Survey biases ..................................................................................................... 23	  
3.2.1	   Interpretation bias .................................................................................. 23	  
3.2.2	   Non response ......................................................................................... 23	  
3.3	   Relation of interview and survey with the research problem ............................ 24	  
4	   ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................... 25	  
4.1	   Interview ............................................................................................................ 25	  
4.2	   Survey ................................................................................................................ 26	  
4.2.1	   Classifying questions ............................................................................. 26	  
4.2.2	   Gambler’s fallacy .................................................................................. 27	  
4.2.3	   Herding/crowd ....................................................................................... 28	  
4.2.4	   Prospect theory ...................................................................................... 29	  
 
 
 
 
4.2.5	   Sin 1 (Pride) .......................................................................................... 31	  
5	   RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................... 32	  
5.1	   Satisfaction measurement .................................................................................. 32	  
5.2	   Up-to-date information ...................................................................................... 33	  
5.3	   Information equal to knowledge ....................................................................... 34	  
6	   CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 35	  
SOURCES ...................................................................................................................... 36	  
 
Appendix 1 Interview Questions 
Appendix 2   Survey Questionnaires 
Behavioral finance during financial crisis in a banking company 
 
 
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
After the end of civil war in 2006, the political situation got worse in Ne-
pal. The civil war lasted for ten years. It started in 1996 and ended in 
2006. The country’s financial budget plan, which was supposed to be an-
nounced every year, could not be announced for two successive years be-
cause of the political situation. Living conditions and employment oppor-
tunities deteriorated for the civilians. This resulted in a high degree of em-
igration from the country when people were in search of better employ-
ment opportunities. The Ministry of Labour then, announced that the 
number of people emigrating from Nepal had reached a peak level. Every 
day 1000 people were emigrating in search of jobs. 
 
One of the major sources of income for the country is foreign remittance. 
But at the same time, the whole world had been shaken by an economic 
crisis. The crisis did not affect the economy of Nepal directly but one of 
the major sources of income of the country, i.e. remittance got low. Be-
cause of this, banks in Nepal had to go through a critical period where 
they did not have enough fund to carry out day-to-day operations. People 
had to inform their bank three days prior for withdrawing over a hundred 
thousand rupees (which is approximately equal to one thousand euros) 
from their own account. Even if the account holder informed the bank 
three days in advance, the banks may have had difficulties finding and ar-
ranging the sum. The bank may have had to ask for a loan from another 
bank. At this critical point, the inter-banking loan percentage started get-
ting higher. At one point it reached as high as 14 per cent. 
  
NRB (Nepal Rastra Bank) ignored the unhealthy competition and govern-
ance in the financial sector. Taking advantage of the situation, a number of 
banking and financial institutions (BFIs) came into existence and the NRB 
let them pop up without even evaluating if the economy needed so many 
of them.  
 
This created a negative impact on people’s minds. People were not able to 
make any rational decisions regarding investments. A fear was born in 
people’s minds. They were afraid to invest. Though the situation is not the 
same now, people still put too much weight on their past experiences. 
People still think that it is not a good idea to invest their savings into the 
bank but rather into immovable properties such as gold, silver, land etc. 
This caused the economy to become immobilized and immobilization of 
the economy raised the crisis level. 
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1.2 Case company 
Panchashil Multi-Purpose Co-operative Limited commissioned the study. 
The company was established in 2006 under the cooperative Act 2048 
(regd. no. 43/056/057) by the authority of Nepal Government through the 
initiative of different experienced people in related fields. The head office 
of PMCL (Figure 1) is situated in Kumaripati-5, Lalitpur, Nepal. Ku-
maripati is an industrial place situated in Lalitpur, which is the heart of the 
capital city, i.e. Kathmandu. 
 
PMCL is a small banking company, which collects the money from the 
public with an attractive interest rate and utilizes this to raise the living 
standard of farmers, labourers and unemployed low-income people as well 
as the industrialists of the country who are not able to extend their busi-
ness because of financial problems.  This means that PMCL supports the 
public financially and invests into different skill-oriented, cash-oriented, 
product-oriented and income generating skills to make farmers, labourers 
and unemployed low-income people capable, independent and successful. 
 
 
Figure 1 Panchashil Multi-Purpose Co-operative Limited 
1.2.1 Employees 
PMCL has 20 employees in different operational fields. One of the major 
fields of operation is marketing, where there is a bit more employees than 
other fields. Communication and networking skills are highly valued with 
these employees. The main reason for this is that the customers of the 
company need to be convinced about the benefits of different types of ac-
counts, for example tax-saving accounts, high income management, loans 
etc. The employees are required to deal with customers on a daily, weekly 
or monthly basis depending upon the type of saving or credit the customer 
wants to deal with. Marketing employees, in most cases, are required to 
give door-to-door service to the customers. 
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1.2.2 Management committee 
The management committee of PMCL consists of three different catego-
ries: the advisor committee, the executive committee and the financial 
committee. The advisor committee consists of four members, the execu-
tive committee consists of seven members, including the chairman, Mr. 
Raju Khatiwada. The financial committee consists of three members. So, 
altogether there are 14 members in the management committee of PMCL. 
1.2.3 Target customers 
The target customers of PMCL are individuals with medium income and 
small and medium sized organizations located in the Kumaripati area. The 
company has another sector, which deals with remittance. So, the target 
customers are also those whose source of income is remittance. Although 
PMCL’s main focus is in the Kumaripati area, they also deal with clients 
from other parts of Kathmandu city such as Lagankhel, Baneshwor, and 
Putalisadak etc. 
1.2.4 Product range 
PMCL has nine different kinds of deposit accounts, which are described in 
brief below: 
 
• Recurring deposit 
 In recurring deposit, an account of amount is deposited for 
certain period of time. It doesn't allow withdrawing the money before the 
maturity period. The rate of interest varies according to the duration of the 
time and the amount too. (PMCL website, 
http://www.panchashilmcl.com.np/recuring_deposit.htm) 
 
• Saving deposit 
 A minimum balance of Rs.1000.00 is required for saving de-
posit, which pays an interest of 8.00% quarterly. (PMCL website, 
http://www.panchashilmcl.com.np/saving_deposit.htm) 
 
• Fixed deposit 
 PMCL provides Fixed Deposit service. It means an account 
of amount deposited for certain period of time. It refers to the deposit of 
fixed amount, fixed interest rate, fixed term and fixed payee. PMCL 
doesn't allow withdrawing the money before the maturity period. The rate 
of interest varies according to the duration of the time and the amount too. 
(PMCL website, http://www.panchashilmcl.com.np/fixed_deposit.htm) 
 
• Bal/Khutruke deposit 
 This type of deposit scheme is specially targeted to the child 
below 16 years. Thinking the future of children, PMCL encourages all the 
children to have a good habit of saving money from their very early age. 
This scheme is helpful to the parents who are financially worried about 
their children's study. PMCL supports to decrease the tension of such par-
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ents and provides khutruke freely to those children who are not able to 
save money daily on their account. It is free to open this account i.e., no 
charges to open this account. As in recuring deposit, amount is deposited 
for certain period of time and additional interest of 0.50% on recuring de-
posit is paid as mentioned above. (PMCL website, 
http://www.panchashilmcl.com.np/bal_khutruke_deposit.htm) 
 
• Grihini deposit 
 This scheme is suitable for women over 40 years who are in-
terested to save money for their future reference. If this account holder 
needs any type of loan in future, then she gains 0.50% discount on compa-
ny's interest charge and service charge but to gain this facility, account 
must hold minimum balance of Rs. 75000.00 or over. No charge to open 
this account but must have minimum balance of Rs. 1500.00 that gets 
8.25% interest monthly. (PMCL website, 
http://www.panchashilmcl.com.np/grihini_deposit.htm) 
 
• Jestha Nagarik deposit 
 This type of deposit is target to the older citizen above 60 
years or retired pension holders who are in seek of secured investment and 
advantageous benefit. This saving scheme can provide regular benefit on 
the minimum balance of Rs. 50000.00 or above. Monthly Rs. 1208.00 in-
terest is provided per Rs. 100000.00 to the multiple of Rs. 50000.00, plus 
0.50% extra interest is provided to the same amount on the auspicious oc-
casion of Dashain. The maturity period of this type of deposit is minimum 
1 year to 5 years. (PMCL website, 
http://www.panchashilmcl.com.np/jestha_nagarik_deposit.htm) 
 
• Remittance deposit 
 PMCL provides the remittance service to our customers and 
this type of saving scheme is targeted to those people who are abroad, far 
from their family and country. It is free to open this account. The money 
sent from any part of the world by the reliable medium of the Western Un-
ion Money Transfer and Prabhu Money Transfer or any other sources is 
deposited on this account safely and money is easily provided to the ac-
count holder's door if necessary. PMCL plans to reward yearly to three ac-
count holders for their best money transactions on yearly sadharan sava. 
Account holders are categorized as first, second and third and are reward-
ed by token of love and certificates. (PMCL website, 
http://www.panchashilmcl.com.np/remittance _deposit.htm) 
 
• Share deposit 
 PMCL provides the share deposit at 11.50% interest rate. 
(PMCL website, http://www.panchashilmcl.com.np/share_deposit.htm) 
 
• Panchashil Special deposit 
 A minimum balance of Rs. 2000.00/- to Rs. 1,00,000/- is re-
quired for Panchashil Special Deposit, which pays daily interest at 11.00% 
to 13.00% to the customers and firms related to PMCL. (PMCL website, 
http://www.panchashilmcl.com.np/panchashil_special_deposit.htm) 
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1.3 Research question 
The final outcome of this thesis is through different models, theories and 
hypotheses written on behavioral finance recommend to the commission-
ing company the best way to overcome the financial crisis created by irra-
tional decision-making behaviour of the investors or the customers. Thus 
the research question is:   
 
How does behavioral finance help to overcome a situation of financial cri-
sis in a banking company caused by cognitive biased behaviour of people? 
1.4 Purpose 
The main purpose of this thesis is to use behavioral finance as a tool and 
suggest the commissioning company a way to overcome a situation caused 
by the irrational decision-making behaviour of the investors or the compa-
ny’s customers. 
 
In order to reach the above-mentioned outcome it is necessary to conduct a 
market analysis. Using the tools and methods that the author has learnt 
during his studies market analysis will be conducted. 
 
An additional purpose of this thesis is to suggest methods of risk manage-
ment to the commissioning company. 
1.5 Methods 
The research includes both qualitative and quantitative methods. 
 
As part of qualitative research method in this project, an interview with 
the management committee of the company was arranged. There were 
some questionnaires sent to the customers of the company. The question-
naires focused on figuring out the decision-making grounds of the custom-
ers based on the seven sins of behavioral critique, which are described be-
low. 
 
As to the quantitative research method used here a survey was conducted 
with the Ministry of Finance of Nepal and also with Nepal Rastra Bank 
(NRB). In addition to these methods, related articles published by verified 
sources, for example newspapers and economists were used as secondary 
research data. 
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2 THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Definition 
Behavioral finance is defined as an era of finance that considers the behav-
iours and psychology of investors outside traditional economic and finan-
cial theory.	  In traditional economic and financial theories either psycholo-
gy of investors is considered rational or the market is considered to be ef-
ficient. Behavioral finance, however, covers two main areas, i.e. cognitive 
psychology and market efficiency. (Ritter 2003, 2.) 
 
Cognitive psychology refers to the way people think. Behavioral finance 
argues that decision making of an individual is not always rational. Deci-
sion-making of an individual can be changed according to his thought. 
Sometimes people might take an instant decision without even thinking of 
anything because of their past experience, sometimes they might be over-
confident and sometimes people might just use the knowledge they have 
gained in order to make a proper decision. It is not certain that the deci-
sions taken on all those circumstances always prove to be the right ones. 
Whatever the case might be, one thing that can be concluded from this be-
haviour of individuals is that people are highly influenced by their thought 
regardless of whether the thought is positive or negative and also regard-
less of whether the result produced by that thought is positive or negative. 
Because people always, in such situations, tend to believe that the decision 
so made, brings a positive output. (Ritter 2003, 2.) 
 
Unlike traditional financial theories, behavioral finance argues that market 
is not always efficient. Modern finance theories consist of a building block 
called EMH or Efficient Markets Hypothesis. The EMH argues that fore-
cast of the future made by markets is unbiased. In contrast to this, behav-
ioral finance argues that the financial markets are not always efficient. 
Markets can easily be affected by predictable human errors and the way 
their information is processed. (Ritter 2003, 2.) 
 
To help us understand better on how people react to different situations 
and what affects the rational thinking of an individual, behavioral finance 
deals with different models. 
 
There are many models, theories and hypotheses of behavioral finance ex-
plained by many prominent researchers. Different researchers have studied 
human behaviour and their decision-making criteria and tried to explain 
them under different supporting models of behaviour finance. A few of 
those are explained in brief in this thesis. But before that getting familiar-
ized with the banking legislation of Nepal is necessary. 
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2.2 Banking legislation of Nepal 
Nepal Rastra Bank is the central bank of Nepal. It supervises the banking 
and financial system of Nepal and maintains stability and foster amongst 
the banking and financial bodies for their healthy competition. 
 
Nepal Rastra Bank has classified banks and financial institutions into four 
different categories according to the paid-up capital. The four categories 
are, category A, B, C and D. There are certain dos and don’ts for carrying 
out financial transactions by banks and financial institutions of all the cat-
egories. According to this classification, PMCL (the case company) falls 
on “D” category.  
2.2.1 The dos 
According to Nepal Rastra Bank, a class “D” licenced financial institution 
may carry on the following transactions: 
a) Supplying credit as prescribed; 
b) Supplying micro-credit with or without any movable or immovable 
property as the collateral or security, for operating any micro-
enterprise to any group or members thereof who have regularly 
saved for the period prescribed by the Rastra Bank and maintained 
the prescribed saving; 
c) Obtaining loans or grants from any licensed institution or native or 
foreign organization, and use such loans or grants for the supply of 
micro-credit or for making the same effective; 
Provided that approval of the Rastra Bank shall be obtained prior to 
obtaining loans or grants from any foreign organization. 
d) Prior to supplying micro-credits, evaluating the schemes for which 
micro-credits have been requested and determining whether they 
are feasible; 
e) Engaging in micro-enterprises of such type as may improve the 
economic condition of low-income persons; 
f) Holding symposia on micro-enterprises, providing assistance and 
training in the formulation of schemes, providing technical know-
how and mobilizing technical assistance, as required; 
g) Providing necessary services to a group in respect of the mobiliza-
tion of micro-credit; 
h) Taking necessary action towards the timely realization of micro-
credits; 
i) Monitoring whether micro-credits have been properly utilized, and, 
if they are found not to have been properly utilized, issuing neces-
sary directives; 
j) Subject to the limit prescribed by the Rastra Bank, accepting de-
posits with or without interest, and refund such deposits; 
k) Obtaining credits by pledging its movable and immovable assets as 
collateral, and properly managing the assets; 
l) Writing off credits, subject to the bye-laws framed by the Board; 
m) Exchanging with the Rastra Bank or any other licensed institutions 
particulars of, information or notices on debtors or customers who 
Behavioral finance during financial crisis in a banking company 
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have obtained credit or any kind of facility from it and other li-
censed institutions; 
n) Performing such other functions as may be prescribed by the Ras-
tra Bank. 
(Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 2063-2006, Section 47) 
2.2.2 The don’ts 
The activities prohibited for being carried out by a licensed institution: 
a) Purchasing or selling goods for commercial purpose, or purchasing 
any immovable property except when it is required for its own use; 
Provided that this Clause shall not be deemed to prevent the li-
censed institutions of Classes “B” and “D” from purchasing, sell-
ing, distributing and managing lands and buildings in connection 
with carrying on their business transactions subject to Section 47. 
b) Advancing credit against the security of its own shares; 
c) Supplying credit or facility to any promoters, directors, persons 
who have subscribed one per cent or more of its shares, chief ex-
ecutive or any family member of such persons or to any firms, 
companies or institutions which are entitled to nominate or appoint 
directors; 
d) Supplying any type of credit or facility to any promoters, directors, 
persons who have subscribed one per cent or more of its shares, 
chief executive or any family member of such persons or managing 
agent or any firms, companies or institutions which are entitled to 
nominate or appoint directors or any firms, companies or institu-
tions in which the institution has a financial interest; 
e) Supplying credit or facility in an amount exceeding such percent-
age of its capital fund as may be prescribed by the Rastra Bank to a 
single customer, company and companies or partnership firms of a 
single group; 
Explanation: The expression “companies or partnership firms of a 
single group” means a group of such companies or partnership 
firms as may be prescribed by the Rastra Bank from time to time. 
f) Supplying any type of credit to any person, firm, company or insti-
tution against the guarantee given by the promoters, directors or 
chief executive; 
g) Making investment in the securities of those licensed institutions 
which have obtained permission from the Rastra Bank to carry on 
the financial transactions of Classes “A”, “B” and “C”; 
h) Making investment of an amount exceeding the limit prescribed by 
the Rastra Bank in the share capital of any other institution; 
i) Indulging with other licensed institutions to mutually create any 
type of monopoly or any other type of controlled practice in the fi-
nancial transactions; 
j) Doing any kind of act which is capable of creating an artificial ob-
struction in the competitive environment of the financial sector, 
with the intention of deriving undue advantage; 
k) Doing such other acts prohibited from being done by a licensed in-
stitution as may be prescribed by the Rastra Bank. 
(Banks and Financial Institutions Act 2063-2006, Section 48.) 
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2.3 Faulty framing 
People tend to reach a conclusion based on a framing that is created in 
their mind in a given situation. For example if people were told that they 
have 50 per cent chance of winning a lottery tonight, then they most prob-
ably would buy the lottery ticket. But if the same thing were told in a dif-
ferent way, then it would plant a completely different idea in their mind. 
For example, if they were told that if they would buy a lottery ticket to-
night, then it is 50 per cent sure that they would loose their money on the 
lottery ticket. 
 
This also applies to the investors who buy stocks in the stock market. 
While buying the stocks, they create a pyramid of their thoughts. They 
open a mental account where they continue to mark their stock value to 
the same price, as it was when they first bought it even after the market 
price has changed. They do not care about the losses they see in the papers 
because mentally they still are calculating that the price has remained un-
changed or probably risen. This hope only dies then, when they have to 
sell their stocks. Only at this point, they realize that the share value has 
dropped and they have had a huge loss. According to economist Richard 
Thaler, mental accounting is an economic concept, which explains that in-
dividuals divide their current and future assets into separate, non-
transferrable portions. This means that people make all the calculations 
and transactions in their minds and follow accordingly while making fi-
nancial decisions. 
2.4 Hindsight bias 
Hindsight bias refers to a bias feeling on people where they put too much 
weight on their past experience. People tend to believe that they already 
knew what would have happened in the past. It is a tendency where after 
an event has occurred, people tend to think that they could forecast the re-
sult of that event earlier on. 
 
In case of investors, hindsight bias misleads them that they could have 
seen the losing stocks beforehand and they could have avoided buying 
such stocks. This leads them into a feeling of regret. The realization of 
such losses is painful to investors. The investors could only feel happier if 
by any means, they had avoided buying losing stocks. 
 
If we take an example of two people who had forecasted the future of a 
winning and a losing stock respectively, then the one who had forecasted 
the winning stock says quite obviously that the result was so predictable 
and that he didn’t have any difficulty predicting that there would be a gain 
in that stock. But if you ask the one who had forecasted the losing stock, 
he says with regret that deep inside he had known that the stock he fore-
casted was a losing one. They try to view this world as more predictable 
than it really is. This biased behaviour of people is known as hindsight bi-
as. 
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2.5 Prospect theory 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky developed prospect theory in 1979. 
Prospect theory is based on loss aversion. 
 
Loss aversion means that people are more sensitive towards loss than gain. 
A gain of 10€ makes people happy but the level of happiness is less if we 
compare it to a level of sadness or pain because of a loss of 10€ faced by 
the same person. This was a simple example comparing the gain and loss 
of 10€. We can explain this example with a different approach as well. If a 
person looses 5€ and then gains 15€, then he feels happy because his net 
gain is 10€, but he would have felt happier if he had just gained 10€ with-
out any loss. This is simple human behaviour. 
 
It is a known fact that people hold on losing shares for longer time and sell 
off the winning shares. The way we think is that, we are in a profit level 
and are making money with these shares so let’s sell them right away, so 
that we can have some profit in our hand. But with the losing share, people 
tend to believe that someday the price of the share will rise up and that 
would be the right time to sell those shares and now while we are still los-
ing, it is not the right time to sell them. (Bernéus, Sandberg and Wahlbeck 
2008, 10.) 
 
The magnitude of loss aversion can be represented graphically. 
 
Figure 2 Loss aversion diagram, Adopted from Investopedia, 2008 
In the figure above, if loss and gain are plotted in x-axis, and pain and 
happiness in y-axis, then the amount of happiness provided by a gain of 
10€ is +x while the pain given by a loss of 10€ is –y. Even from the graph, 
it can be seen that y is far greater than x, i.e. y>x. Some researches even 
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argue that the pain of losing something is double than the joy of gaining 
something of equivalent value, i.e. y=2x. 
2.6 Gambler’s fallacy 
If there is an expected result for something but the actual result keeps de-
viating from that expected result for a repeated number of times in some 
random process, then people start believing that the future deviation would 
be in the opposite direction. This belief in terms of behavioral finance is 
known as gambler’s fallacy. (Bernéus, Sandberg and Wahlbeck 2008, 10.) 
 
Let’s illustrate this using an example. Let us suppose that there are two 
balls placed in a container. One of the balls is red in colour and the other 
one is blue. Now, a ball is drawn out of the container without looking at it 
in a random order. Let us assume that the ball so drawn happened to be the 
red one. After five continuous trial of drawing out a ball in random order, 
if it happens to be the red one all those five times, then what would a per-
son start thinking? Through many researches and collected data, research-
ers have concluded that a normal person would think that in next draw, the 
outcome is more probable to be the blue ball, which is not true. Because 
the probability of next ball drawn out to be the blue ball is still half. Mean-
ing that there still is 50 per cent chance that the next ball drawn out is the 
red one. 
 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky first proposed gambler’s fallacy as a 
cognitive bias produced by psychological thinking. According to them, 
people tend to evaluate the probability of a certain event by looking at the 
surrounding events or by accessing what has happened in the past.  
2.7 Herding/crowd 
Most of the people have a tendency to believe that if same decision is 
made by a large number of people, then it cannot be wrong. Herding be-
haviour is to copy other’s behaviour or to copy the decision made by other 
and avoid one’s own thinking or decision-making capacity. 
 
This can be very well illustrated by an example. Most of us, at some point, 
have been in a situation where we go to a movie theatre to watch a movie 
but we don’t know which one to watch. Let us imagine a group of 50 peo-
ple facing the same dilemma. There are two movies, X and Y, having the 
same show time and in the same theatre. The movie review says that the 
movie X is 51 per cent preferable whereas the movie Y is 49 per cent. If 
all those 50 people reach to the movie theatre in a sequence, then what 
they do is, observe the choice made by the person in front of them. 
Though they know the prior probabilities of the movies, they tend to be in-
fluenced by the decision made by the person in front of them. For exam-
ple, out of those 50 people, 48 people had a mind set that most probably 
they would watch the movie Y, but if the remaining 2 people get to choose 
the movie at first, then all 48 are influence by their decision. If those 2 
people choose the movie X, then the person going after them will start 
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thinking that the 2 people in front of him had a signal that favoured the 
movie X, while his own signal was in favour of the movie Y. Because of 
this, the person behind him gets the same vibes as he did and chooses the 
movie Y as well. This makes the movie Y better than movie X. Had that 
3rd person followed his own signal and chosen movie X instead of movie 
Y, then most of the people would have followed him and watched movie 
X since it was more preferable than the movie Y. But people have a ten-
dency of following the crowd no matter wherever it is heading to. 
 
Thus herding behaviour means a large number of people acting in the 
same way just because the person in front of them acted it that way. But 
this does not apply in the obvious reasons. For example, if someone in the 
above example believes or has a belief from a known source that movie X 
is better than movie Y; he definitely goes for the movie X. This herding 
behaviour implies only then, when people are not in an easy phase of deci-
sion-making and a little effort is enough to influence their decision. 
2.8 Confirmation bias 
Confirmation bias is a behavioral bias in decision-making process where 
one tries to imply his existing belief about something while making a deci-
sion. If something deviates from the existing belief of an individual, then 
the individual is more likely to seek for an option where he sees something 
that confirms his existing belief. People with confirmation bias try to 
avoid the information, which contradicts with the existing information that 
they have (Bernéus, Sandberg and Wahlbeck 2008, 7.) 
 
Let us take an example of a football match to illustrate confirmation bias. 
Let us assume that a football match just ended where a team, “team A” 
won the match and another team, “team B” lost the match. An individual 
is given a task to write a match review on that game. He believes that team 
B lost the match due to a poor performance of a particular player, say 
player X of team B. He then interviews few of the audiences and asks 
them the reason why team B lost the game. Some audiences, for example 
say that team B lost the match because team A had a better performance 
and many star players and other audiences, for example say the loss was 
because of a poor performance by the player X. Then while writing the 
match review, he tries to neglect the fact told by some of the audiences, 
i.e. team A had a better performance and many star players in their team. 
He tries to focus on the point that the match was lost because of poor per-
formance by the player X because this is what he believes. This belief is 
also supported by few of the audiences. At this point, the review writer 
tries to avoid the information provided by the other audiences because it 
contradicts with the existing information or belief that he had. He might 
write a few sentences regarding this information as well but throughout his 
match review he continues to focus on the pre-information he had or as-
sumption that he had already made. He tries to seek evidence that supports 
his belief about the match and continues focusing on that point. This bi-
ased behaviour of the match review writer is called confirmation bias. 
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2.9 Behavioral critique 
Sin city 
 
There are seven sins explained in A Practitioners Guide to Applying Be-
havioural Finance  
By James Montier, which force people to make irrational decisions. 
  
• Sin 1: Forecasting (Pride)  
 
Using forecast, as an integral part of the investment process is not good. 
  
• Sin 2: The Illusion of Knowledge (Gluttony)  
 
Jack-of-all-trades but master of none - Instead of focusing on few im-
portant issues, investors tend to act like an expert about everything. More 
information on something makes a person overconfident rather than a 
good decision maker. 
 
• Sin 3: Meeting Companies (Lust)  
 
Not always, but sometimes companies just waste their time doing meet-
ings when there is nothing more important to do. Most of the time the 
meetings don’t just go to conclusion and it is merely a mutual love-in. It is 
often used in filling in time that just makes the companies look busy. 
  
• Sin 4: Thinking you can outsmart everyone else (Envy)  
 
Every investor thinks that he can get in at the bottom and get out at the 
top. 
  
• Sin 5: Short time Horizons and Overtrading (Avarice)  
 
Investors end up trying to perform on very short time horizons thus end up 
overtrading. 
  
• Sin 6: Believing everything you read (Sloth)  
 
We all hear success stories but stories can be misleading. Instead of being 
inspired by a story and blindly following it, it is better to take a look at the 
facts and work accordingly. 
  
• Sin 7: Group-Based Decisions (Wrath)  
 
Many decisions made by the investors are a result of group interaction. 
But groups tend to amplify the decision-making process rather than solv-
ing the problems. Rather than dividing problems it sometimes just multi-
plies them and thus making the decision-making process very tough. 
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2.9.1 Pride 
Lao Tzu, a philosopher of ancient China, has said that, “Those who have 
knowledge don’t predict. Those who predict don’t have knowledge.” 
 
A force of overconfidence drives predicting or forecasting. According to 
James Montier, the two most common biases are overconfidence and over-
optimism. Overconfident person does not have any uncertainty about his 
own ability, correctness or successfulness. Overconfidence results in a sit-
uation where people get more surprised by the result than they should ac-
tually be. (James Montier 2008, 99.) 
 
James Montier has also stated that experts are more overconfident than lay 
people. Experts are generally much too sure about their ability to predict 
something. Similarly, professional investors are proved to be particularly 
overconfident. In his book, James Montier has said that he has found 75% 
of fund managers think that they are above average at their job. He has al-
so mentioned a recent study where 68% of analysts thought they were 
above average at forecasting earnings. (James Montier 2008, 99.) 
 
Psychologists have determined that overconfidence causes people to over-
estimate their knowledge, underestimate risks and exaggerate their ability 
to control events. People continue forecasting even after many evidences 
have proved that they aren’t good at forecasting. This is because of two 
human characters, i.e. ignorance and arrogance. 
 
Ignorance means that a person is not aware of his overconfidence. For ex-
ample, a person who is continuing to do wrong forecasts still believes that 
he is more than able to predict. Not knowing that he is overconfident, the 
person has ignorant characteristic. 
 
Arrogance means that a person is aware that he is overconfident but he 
thinks that he should well be overconfident because he is the expert on the 
field. Such people display their superiority or self-importance in an offen-
sive manner. Whenever the prediction done by such people is wrong, they 
tend to say that it was a case of exception. 
 
James Montier has given so many evidences that people are generally 
dreadful at forecasting and yet many investors use forecasting at the very 
centre of their investment process. James Montier, however, has given 
some suggestions that can be used in order to avoid forecasting during in-
vestment process. The most obvious solution, according to him, is to stop 
relying on pointless forecasts. He has suggested the use of other strategies, 
such as value-based strategies based on trial earnings, instead of using 
pointless forecasts. He has also suggested us to redirect our efforts away 
from forecasting. Instead of having economists who make an influence on 
investors by making forecasts, it is better to have a group of analysts who 
can analyse the present and understand what that means for the future. 
James Montier knows that his suggestions require a radical re-think of the 
investment process and hence, it is unlikely to occur. 
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2.9.2 Gluttony 
Often information is mistaken for knowledge. People tend to think that 
more the information they have, better the information is. This is not al-
ways true. Information is raw form of statistics or data used to define a 
specific situation whereas knowledge is something that is applied to inter-
pret information about the situation and decide how to handle it. 
 
Information is not knowledge until and unless it is applied effectively. Al-
bert Einstein has also said that information is not knowledge. More infor-
mation and better information are two different things. More information 
does not always mean that the information is better. Instead of giving 
more accuracy, more information makes a person rather overconfident.  
 
Confucius has said that, “When you know a thing, to hold that you know 
it, and when you do not know a thing, to allow that you do not know it – 
this is knowledge.” 
 
James Montier, while defining illusion of knowledge, has used a study 
made by Oskamp, back in 1965. In his study, Oskamp set up a profile of a 
young man (Joseph Kidd) who was seeking clinical psychological help. 
He then divided the information flow into four different stages. Out of 
those four stages, in stage one, psychologists were given very little infor-
mation on the young man, i.e. Joseph Kidd. They were told that Joseph is 
a 29-year-old white man who is unmarried and a veteran of World War II. 
They were also given information of his current situation. They were said 
that he is a college graduate and now works as a business assistant in floral 
decorating studio. At the end of each stage’s presentation, the psycholo-
gists were required to answer questions of Joseph’s behavioral patterns, at-
titudes, interests and typical reactions to real life events. Each stage was 
added up with new information. For example, in second stage, the psy-
chologists were given information on Joseph’s childhood through the age 
of 12. Then on third stage, the psychologists were informed about Jo-
seph’s high school and college life. The final stage, i.e. the fourth stage 
consisted of the information of Joseph’s later part of the life, i.e. from ar-
my service to his present life (Montier 2008, 135.) 
 
Oskamp then drew a graph of confidence and accuracy in all those four 
stages. The graph below represents the confidence gained by the psy-
chologists, and the accuracy of the answers of the psychologists on Jo-
seph’s behavioral patterns, attitudes, interests and typical reactions to real 
life events. (Montier 2008, 135.) 
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Figure 3 Adopted from James Montier which was originally adopted from Oskamp 
It can be clearly seen from the graph that no judgement has ever reached 
an accuracy of 50% or more. The accuracy has only marginally increased 
as the information is increased from the first stage to the fourth stage but 
something has gone wrong with the confidence level. As the information 
has increased in each stage, the confidence level of psychologists have 
gone remarkably high, from 33% in the first stage to 53% in the fourth 
stage. 
 
On the same study, Oskamp has also followed the number of psycholo-
gists who change their mind at each stage. He has plotted them in a graph 
as well. 
  
Figure 4 Adopted from James Montier which was originally adopted from Oskamp 
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Surprisingly, as the amount of information increased from the second 
stage to the fourth stage, the number of psychologists changing their 
minds dropped from 40% to 25%. Oskamp has summed this up saying that 
the psychologists might have already formed a stereotype conclusion in 
stage one, so they didn’t change their mind even after new information 
was given in different stages. 
2.9.3 Lust 
We have already noticed above that more information is not better infor-
mation. Yet, when there are company meetings, one thing they seek for is 
information. There is a flow of information. More information, instead of 
creating better investment opportunities, rather creates an increased confi-
dence level. And as discussed above in the second sin, gluttony, an in-
crease in confidence level does not increase accuracy. 
 
Like everybody else, corporate managers are also victims of cognitive il-
lusions. They also suffer from cognitive biases as a normal person does. 
One of the biases that should be mentioned here is confirmation bias. In-
stead of finding out a solution that disagrees to a base case in a meeting, 
often it is tried to seek out for the information that agrees to the base case. 
Confirmation bias can be defined as a habit of looking for information that 
agrees with us. So, in the meetings, rather than trying to find a solution, 
one tries to find information that supports the point of view one is already 
having. This can prove that instead of providing deep insights on why an 
investment should be made, company meetings can sometimes be only 
filling out time with something that makes them look busy. (Montier 2008, 
143.) 
 
A classic example of managers being overconfident is that they are more 
optimistic about their own company than the economy as a whole. When it 
comes to behavioral biases, managers are just average as the rest of us. 
They are as biased as the rest of us. If it is all about re-confirming what 
they already believe, then it’s just a waste of time doing company meet-
ings. (Montier 2008, 143.) 
 
Another reason why meetings can be sometimes waste of time is that we 
tend to be too much obedient to the authority. James Montier argues that 
we have a tendency to believe in what we are told by the people in posi-
tions of authority. We appear to follow instructions and do what we are 
told to do simply because the person giving orders is a higher-ranking per-
son than us. The figures and facts given to analysts and fund managers are 
too easy to be believed as an authority figure and there is no difficulty for 
the analysts and fund manager to believe what they are told to believe. The 
stronger the management is, the easier it is to influence the analysts who 
cover the stock. 
 
Another reason why company meetings is not always fruitful is that we 
tend to believe that we can spot lies. Whenever someone is trying to fool 
us or deceive us, we have a tendency to believe that we can spot it. While 
having company meetings, it is not always the fact that we hear truth in 
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the meeting. James Montier argues that we generally perform in line with 
pure chance. We might be able to spot the lies but that is not the case al-
ways. So, if we are having meetings where we cannot spot the lies, then 
there is no point in having the meeting at all. This is merely a waste of 
time and filling up our schedule so that we look busy all the time. 
2.9.4 Envy 
James Montier has pointed out that people have a tendency to believe that 
they can outsmart everyone else. 
 
Above, we have been discussing about how over-confidence and over-
optimism are two factors that persist in us in some form. Yet, after reading 
so much on behavioral finance, we tend to think that we know it the best 
and we can outsmart everyone else. This is the kind of behavioral critique 
that exists as a sin in all of us. 
 
Because of a pressure to perform on month-to-month basis, professional 
investors are forced to make their decision on a risky situation. James 
Montier argues that such people think that they are the better ones out 
there. But it isn’t possible for every single investor to be on the top. Of 
course, the best is always only one. Somebody has to be crushed. 
 
James Montier conducted a survey to see whether or not his argument 
about people’s thinking that they can outsmart everyone else is valid. He 
names his survey as a game where people were asked to pick a number 
from 1-100 and the winner would be those people who can get close to 
two third of the average number picked. In this “game”, one had to try to 
think of a number, which other people might pick and then pick a number, 
which is two-third of that number. In simple words, if 10 people pick 
number 100, then the people who pick two-third of it, i.e. 66.67 (closest to 
it could be 66 or 67), would be the winners. He had 1000 respondents. But 
if every respondent thinks it the same way, i.e. 67 would be the winning 
number, then the winning number would change to two third of 67, i.e. 44. 
And if they think that the winning number would be 44 and most of them 
chose 44, then the winning number would change again to two third of 44, 
i.e. 29 and this process will keep on continuing. (Montier 2008, 163-168.) 
 
The result of James Montier’s survey was that the average number chosen 
by most of the people (22% of the total respondents) was 26. So, the win-
ning number, i.e. two third of 26 is 14. Only 3 participants out of 1000 got 
it right. (Montier 2008, 163-168.) 
 
What can be concluded from this is that people keep on thinking they can 
outsmart everyone else. The rookie participant of the survey, who James 
Montier classifies as level 1 respondent, chose a number 50. Then the par-
ticipants with a higher level of imagination chose two third of that num-
ber, i.e. 33. Then third level participants, as classified by James Montier, 
chose 22. 9% of the total participants chose this number, which is quite a 
high figure. 
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2.9.5 Avarice 
People seem to put a short time deadline to everything in the financial and 
the investment world. According to James Montier, trustees, consultants 
and internal managers seem to have a want to evaluate their fund manag-
ers as frequently as possible. (Montier 2008, 179-181.) 
 
James Montier also argues that the investor who invests on long-term ex-
pectation is likely to face more risks than the one investing on short-term 
expectation. According to him, one who can guess and follow people’s 
behaviour easily makes a lot of return of his share prices by investing on 
short-term basis rather than waiting for a longer period of laborious days 
and unsure return. But his study proves that if the investors investing on 
long-term horizons and short-time horizons respectively are of same level, 
meaning that they both have equal intelligence, then it is more likely that 
the one who invests on short-time horizon makes disastrous mistakes. 
 
It is true by human nature that we desire more money in less period of 
time. He who invests in long-term returns has to be more patient and wait 
for a long time to make profit from his investment. People would rather 
gamble and make a quick profit than wait for a long period of time and be 
uncertain how much the profit is going to be. 
 
James Montier argues that long-term investment strategy should be 
brought into practice. He says that if long-term investment strategy is 
brought into practice, companies can be more honest about the risk of loss 
in short time, which will be very high. James Montier has mentioned that 
this creates a better-structured contract between the ultimate investors and 
their chosen agent. This, according to James Montier, will also discourage 
people from using their illusion of knowledge and making wrong deci-
sions. (Montier 2008, 179-181.) 
 
When investors are myopic (short-sighted), they tend to check their per-
formance frequently. James Montier has argued that, the more frequently 
they check their portfolio performance, the more likely they are to encoun-
ter a loss. 
 
We all know that people tend to underperform when they are repeatedly 
pressurized to produce a better result within a short period of time. This 
disorder that forces people to underperform is known as Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). James Montier says that analysts need to 
stop obsessing about the next quarterly set of results, which will allow the 
managers to get back to running their business, so that the shareholders 
can be benefited. (Montier 2008, 179-181.) 
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2.9.6 Sloth 
If we want to understand something, we need to believe it first. It might 
not be the case that every story we hear around the corner is true. It is im-
portant for us to be able to put our own effort to know whether the story 
being told is a real one or is somebody just trying to drift us away? Stock-
brokers have an ability to spin a story and spread a particular message 
around. It is not necessary that the message so spread is true. Stockbrokers 
play their part to attract the investors. The hope of growth drags investors 
to believe in what stockbroker has to say. Finally they end up losing mon-
ey on shares. (Montier 2008, 189-191.) 
 
The rational world says that after you hear a story, go around and gather 
the evidence, then evaluate it, then weight it, and finally you can make 
your decision based on the evaluation. However, in the real world, i.e. the 
behavioral world, we collect evidences, which are usually in a biased fash-
ion, and then what we do is construct a story to explain those evidences 
and use the same story to reach a decision. This, according to psycholo-
gists, is explanation-based decision-making. James Montier has drawn a 
diagram, which can help us understand this better which he calls the story-
model of thinking. (Montier 2008, 189-191.) 
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James Montier has suggested some valuable information if we are to really 
try and assess the validity of an argument. He suggests us to try our best to 
avoid distractions, which can picture us misleading stories, for example, 
turning off our screens, putting our cell phones to call forwarding, trying 
to cut ourselves us from all sort of noises. This will give us a clear chance 
to weigh and evaluate the gathered evidence, so that we can make a better 
decision. (Montier 2008, 189-191.) 
2.9.7 Wrath 
Psychologists have spent many years and concluded that the decisions 
made by a group are worse than an individual decision. This might be be-
cause of the fact that when we are making an individual decision, we have 
to deal with our own biases but when it comes to a group-based decision, 
we have to deal with the biases of everyone else included in the group. 
(Montier 2008, 209.) 
 
The dream model of a group-based decision is that after meeting in a 
group, there will be exchange of ideas and a sensible conclusion can be 
reached on that ground. It is believed that the group members working in a 
group will offset each other’s biases and make the decision more sensible. 
But in reality, it doesn’t happen so. Instead of offsetting each other’s bias-
es, group tend to amplify those biases and create a bigger situation of cha-
os. We could have a variety of options if we were to reach a conclusion on 
our won but in a group, the options are cut down to less. James Montier 
argues that groups are also very bad at uncovering hidden information.  
 
While in a group, people tend to drop down their own point-of-view and 
they tend to agree with others. This might be because people have a ten-
dency where the more they hear a view, the more confident they become 
that the view is true. 
 
Group decisions often make a group more confident in their decision but 
more confidence doesn’t yield more accuracy. This is because people just 
become too sure about the views they hold. (Montier 2008, 209.) 
 
One factor why groups are bad on information sharing could be because of 
social pressure. Someone who has information might not simply share it if 
he is from a relatively low status. If he does, he might look stupid in front 
of his colleagues. The risk of reputation is too high for that low status per-
son to share the information, which might not fit in the group. This might 
go the other way round. For example, if there is someone in the group who 
is of a relatively low status, people might have a strong tendency to agree 
to the information he shares in the group, even though the information he 
shared is of no use or is not true. (Montier 2008, 209.) 
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3 RESEARCH 
In the following chapter, various methods used for data collection as a part 
of the research, are discussed. 
3.1 Data collection 
Data collection was conducted using primary research method. In order to 
get a clear view on behavioral finance, the company and the customer’s 
reactions to it, the research was divided into two parts: Interviews with the 
management and a survey with the customers. 
3.1.1 Management interview 
Before conducting the interview with the management, open-ended ques-
tions were designed. There were a number of issues to be addressed in the 
interview. The aftermath of the crisis and the customers’ reactions to it 
were the main issues that needed attention. 
 
Apart from the aftermath of the crisis and customers’ reactions to it, there 
was an important issue that needed to be addressed, i.e. the inter-banking 
loan. This might not be familiar to all. The unavailability of funds in a 
bank forces that bank to take a loan from another bank in order to carry 
out the required day-to-day operations. This situation occurred in the 
banking industry in Nepal because of the banking crisis during the civil 
war. During this period, the issue was common. Many banks were facing 
problems with a high inter-banking loan percentage. The banks, which had 
enough fund, were not there to do the charity work, so, they kept on in-
creasing the inter-banking loan percentage. The inter-banking loan per-
centage during that period was 14%, which is considered quite a high per-
centage. 
 
Since the commissioning company is in Nepal and a group interview with 
the management committee was not possible, interview questions were 
sent well in advance via email to the management committee of the com-
pany. Then a date was agreed for the interview. The management commit-
tee had a meeting where they came up with answers to the interview ques-
tions. Since it was not possible to be physically present at the case compa-
ny during the interview, Mr. Raju Khatiwada, the chairman of the compa-
ny, gave a phone interview representing all the committee members on the 
agreed interview date. The interview mainly focused on determining the 
following things: 
 
• Banking and financial crisis due to the political situation of Nepal 
and the effect of the global crisis. 
• Management point-of-view on customer behaviour. 
• Inter-banking loans. 
• Preparations for avoiding a similar situation in the future. 
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3.1.2 Survey with the case company’s customers 
In addition to the interview with the management, a survey was conducted 
also with the customers of the case company. 
 
The survey was mainly focused on determining the people’s tendencies re-
lated to the chosen theory. The customers in this case were compared to 
the investors in the theory. For the survey, customers with a share invest-
ment in the case company and customers with fixed deposits in the case 
company were chosen. The reason behind choosing such customers was 
that they could be compared to investors. In Nepal’s context people are 
more attracted to invest their capital in a fixed deposit account in a bank 
rather than other places, because this gives them more return on the in-
vestment than any other businesses. Apart from the return, investors feel 
more secured to deposit their capital in a bank. Like the interview ques-
tions, survey questionnaires were also sent to the chairman of the case 
company, i.e. Mr. Raju Khatiwada. He then handed them out to the share-
holders and people with fixed deposit accounts in the banking company. 
 
The main focus of the survey was to examine how investors, reacted to a 
problematic situation presented to them. There were both direct and indi-
rect questions included into the questionnaire. The questionnaires were de-
signed in such a way that some problems or situations were addressed, 
which linked to the above-mentioned theories and critiques. The problems 
or situations in the questionnaire were designed in such a way that certain 
behaviours could be traced using the responses. 
 
Most of the questions in the questionnaire were selected from literature 
and surveys conducted by James Montier, Kahneman and Tversky, Hersh 
Shefrin, Richard Thaler etc. All of these researchers are prominent job in 
the literature of behavioral finance. 
3.2 Survey biases 
3.2.1 Interpretation bias 
A glass half-filled with water might look half full to an optimist whereas 
half empty to a pessimist. In the same way the respondents might have in-
terpreted the survey questions designed to trace certain behaviour of the 
investors in a different way than the author intended. 
3.2.2 Non response 
There were a few questions left blank by some respondents. This might be 
because the respondent misunderstood the question or they intentionally 
left a question out, which they did not want to answer. 
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3.3 Relation of interview and survey with the research problem 
The questions asked in the interview mainly focused on the financial crisis 
brought on because of the political situation of the country, i.e. Nepal. The 
management was also asked about the inter-banking loan and its effect on 
customer behaviour. The management was also asked about the steps they 
were thinking of taking in the future so that they could better understand 
the changes in the financial behaviour of their investors/customers. By 
getting answers to all these questions, it would be easy for the author to 
see what steps the management was lacking that would have helped the 
investors to keep having faith in the company. 
 
The survey questions that were asked were mainly linked to the theory 
part of this research. The survey was mainly focused on trying to figure 
out the situations that caused behavioral changes in the inves-
tors/customers. The survey also focused on getting a clear understanding 
on whether the customers reacted to a certain situation in a similar pattern. 
For this purpose, the survey designed by James Montier was taken into 
use. From the survey results, the author could easily determine whether 
the behavioral pattern of reactions to a situation was similar for most of 
the investors. 
 
With combined answers from the interview and the surveys, it was easier 
for the author to know what the management committee thought about the 
behavioral changes in their investors/customers and what the customers 
thought about the management committee when there was a situation of 
dilemma concerning investments. Not only this, the survey also gave a 
clear viewpoint on whether all the investors reacted to a situation in a sim-
ilar way because the answers given by the investors in this survey were 
compared to the answers given by other investors in other surveys con-
ducted by James Montier, Oskamp etc. 
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4 ANALYSIS 
The analysis of this research was carried out in two parts. The first part 
consisted of the answers to the interview questions given by the manage-
ment committee of the commissioning company and the second part con-
sisted of the survey answers from the customers of the commissioning 
company. 
4.1 Interview 
To get a clear view on what was the aftermath of the crisis in the banking 
sector in Nepal, the first question was the effect of the crisis brought to the 
commissioning company by the political situation of Nepal. Mr. Raju 
Khatiwada, the chairman of the company, in response to this question said 
that there were more and more people moving out of the country in search 
of better employment opportunities. Because of this, the bank had lost 
several customers. From this statement, what can be understood is that 
emigration resulted in a situation of financial crisis in all the banks, not 
only the commissioning company. The economy of the whole banking in-
dustry was shaken by the political instability of the country. 
 
As James Montier explained in the 6th of his seven sins; Believing every-
thing you read (Sloth), people started blindly believing what they had 
heard about the crisis situation (Montier 2008, 189). On being asked if 
they lost any customers because of the rumours in the financial market re-
garding high inter-banking loan percentage, chairman Khatiwada said that 
there obviously were rumours going around about the inter-banking loan 
percentage being high. Many people felt insecure to invest their capital in-
to stocks and make a fixed deposit into the company. They weren’t sure if 
the company was going to collapse. They rather chose investing their capi-
tal into immovable assets such as gold, silver, land and properties.  
 
In other banks people had to inform the bank three days in advance if they 
wanted to withdraw a high sum of money but this was not the case with 
this bank, said Mr. Khatiwada. Still, people had a feeling of insecurity to-
wards all the banks and they would rather buy immovable properties and 
utilize their funds than deposit it into a bank. What can be concluded from 
this is that, people tend to believe in stories rather than look at the evi-
dence. According to James Montier, a proper way to make a decision is to 
gather evidence first (Montier 2008, 190). Then the gathered evidence 
should be weighed and evaluated properly. Only after that proper judge-
ment can be made. But what people tend to do is, they gather the evidence, 
then they explain the evidence with a story and then match that story to 
possible decisions. The evidence so collected in the later part is not in a 
proper way. People use biased fashion to collect such evidence. Because 
of the rumours in the financial market, people were using such explana-
tion-based decision-making, which caused the commissioning company to 
lose their customers. 
 
On being asked whether they had tried using any tools or methods to 
change the irrational thinking of their customers, Mr. Khatiwada answered 
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that they did not have any tools or methods that measured the behavioral 
change in people till date but that they would be happy if the author could 
come up with some tools or methods, that they would be able to use in the 
future so that they could be better prepared for the similar situations of be-
havioral change in their customers because of a financial crisis. This clear-
ly shows that the case company would be facing a similar situation if the 
crisis hit back or if their customers showed any behavioral change because 
of an unknown reason. 
4.2 Survey 
The survey was conducted by sending out the questionnaires to the chair-
man of the commissioning company, Mr. Raju Khatiwada who then for-
warded them to the shareholders and fixed deposit account holders of the 
company. 
 
Out of 72 such customers, 94.4%, i.e. 68 people replied. A total of 6 such 
questionnaires (including the classifying questions) were formulated. All 
of the questionnaires so formulated were related to the theory mentioned 
above either directly or indirectly. 
4.2.1 Classifying questions 
The first and the second questions in the questionnaires were classifying 
questions, formulated to find out the gender and the age group of the cus-
tomers involved in the survey. Out of 68 respondents, 58 respondents, i.e. 
85.3% were male and 10 respondents, i.e. 15.7% were female (Figure 6). 
It was expected that most of the respondents would be male customers be-
cause Nepal is a male-dominated country. The head of the family, i.e. a 
male, mostly makes the investments and fixed deposits. 
 
  
Figure 6 PMCL’s customers according to sex 
27 of the 68 respondents were from age group 40-45 (Figure 7). This 
yields 40% of the total respondents. This suggests that people start invest-
ing their money in shares only after they get to their middle age. This was 
also quite an expected result because a big family concept is practiced in 
Nepal. Children live with their parents until they really need to move out 
58	  
85%	  
10	  
15%	  
Sex	  
Male	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for some strong reasons, for example migrating from one place to another 
(within the country) in search of better opportunities or because of a dis-
pute in the family. The head of the family, i.e. the parents in this case 
would then make the financial decisions for the family. Children simply 
bring their income home and give some part of their income to their par-
ents in order to run the basic domestic chores. 
 
 
Figure 7 PMCL’s customers according to age group 
4.2.2 Gambler’s fallacy 
A question based on the theory of gambler’s fallacy (Bernéus, Sandberg 
and Wahlbeck 2008, 7) was formulated and asked to the shareholders and 
fixed deposit account holders of the commissioning company. 
 
Question: A coin is tossed 5 times. Each toss gives you head as a result. If 
you had to bet Rs. 1000 on the next bet, what would you bet for? 
 
All 68 respondents responded to this question. The survey result is repre-
sented graphically below in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8 Result of survey on Gambler’s Fallacy 
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5 people out of 68, i.e. 7% of the total respondents replied that they would 
bet for heads on the next toss, whereas 16 people, i.e. 24% said they would 
bet for tails, and the remaining 47 people, i.e. 69% of the respondents had 
no preference for heads or tails on the next toss. 
 
Most of the people got their answer right to this question. 47 people who 
replied that they do not have any preference for head or tail on the next 
toss were the ones who replied to the question correctly. Because whenev-
er a coin is tossed, whatever the previous result may have been, there is a 
50-50 chance of getting heads or tails as the next result. Getting heads 5 
times during a previous toss does not mean that there is a higher probabil-
ity of getting heads on the next toss as well. 
 
In this case, 69% of respondents made a correct judgement and showed ra-
tional behaviour but it must not be forgot that 31% of the people who ei-
ther answered heads or tails, are the people who are suffering from cogni-
tive biased behaviour. 
4.2.3 Herding/crowd 
Question: There are two restaurants in front of you, one Japanese and one 
Chinese. You have no idea about the type of food they offer and you are 
very hungry. There are 5 people in the Japanese restaurant but the Chinese 
one is empty. Which restaurant will you go to? 
 
There were 67 responses to this question. The result is represented graph-
ically below in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Result of survey on Herding behaviour 
Not having an opinion of one’s own and strongly relying on and following 
what a large number of people have to say or do is known as herd behav-
iour. Herd behaviour is one of the most often encountered behavioral bias-
es among investors in the financial markets. 
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It can be clearly seen from the survey result that 87% of the total respond-
ents want to go to a Japanese restaurant to eat. This might be because they 
thought that the Japanese restaurant had either good food or good service, 
which is why they had five customers there. May be the quality of the 
food or service was not so good in the Chinese restaurant, which was why 
they had no customers at all. Since five people chose the Japanese restau-
rant and were enjoying their food, people were more attracted in going 
there. Had the Chinese restaurant had more customers in their restaurant at 
that time, the people would have preferred to go there. 10% of the re-
spondents in this survey replied that they would prefer going to the Chi-
nese restaurant. Probably these are the people who are not influenced by 
other people’s decisions or may be they just love a peaceful environment.  
 
It was obvious that most of the people were doing what the crowd was do-
ing but it was surprising to see only 3% of people having no preference 
about going to the Japanese or the Chinese restaurant. 
4.2.4 Prospect theory 
Question: You have to make concurrent decisions for the following pair of 
options. First check both the options then make a decision. 
 
There were two sets of decisions to be made in this survey. The options 
for the first decision were: 
A. A sure chance to get Rs. 5000 
B. A 30 per cent chance to get Rs. 150000 and 70 per cent chance to 
get nothing 
 
The options for the second decision were: 
C. A sure loss of Rs. 10000 
D. A 70 per cent chance to loose Rs. 200000 and 30 per cent chance 
to lose nothing 
 
May be the question was a bit unclear or a bit tricky to understand. So, 
there were only 59 responses to this question. The result is represented 
graphically below in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 Result of survey on Prospect theory 
In the first part of decision-making, the respondents had to choose be-
tween a sure gain of Rs. 5000 or a 30 per cent change to gain Rs. 15000 
and 70 per cent chance to gain nothing. There was no surprise on seeing 
85% of the respondents going for a sure gain, as the theory had indicated 
the same. Only 15% of the total respondents were ready to gamble. 
 
In the second part of the decision-making, respondents had to choose be-
tween a sure loss or a 30 per cent probability to lose even more and 70 per 
cent probability to lose nothing. As was mentioned earlier in the theory 
part, the pain of losing something is more than the joy of gaining some-
thing worth the same value (Bernéus, Sandberg and Wahlbeck 2008, 10). 
This was proven by the survey result. People, in this case, were ready to 
gamble. They did not want to loose their money that easily. In the ques-
tion, they had an option where they could have a chance of saving that loss 
and no surprise 68% of the respondents went for this option. The remain-
ing 32% respondents might be those who were unwilling to take a risk in 
any given situation. They might have thought that instead of being in a sit-
uation where one could loose Rs. 200000, it would be better to loose Rs. 
10000 and be sure about no further loss. 
 
People who chose option A in the first decision-making question and D in 
the second decision-making question yielded 44% of the total respondents. 
People, who gambled in the first decision-making question, mostly gam-
bled in the second one, too. We can see in the pie chart (Figure 10), that 
29% of the people were going for the situation of uncertainty, i.e. either 
gain or nothing in the first one and either loss or nothing in the second 
one. It was surprising to see how people who favoured option A in the first 
question favoured option C in the second, i.e. a sure win and a sure loss. 
But not many people made this decision. It was still interesting that the 
percentage of respondents making such a decision was 22. Only 5% of the 
total respondents went for option B in first question and C in the second, 
i.e. gamble to win and a sure loss. This was the most surprising part of the 
survey. 
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4.2.5 Sin 1 (Pride) 
Question: Are you above average at your job? 
 
68 people replied to this question. Here are their responses represented 
graphically in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11 Result of survey on Pride 
James Montier conducted a similar survey among professional investors in 
the United States of America where he found out that 75% of them 
thought they were above average at their job. Only 25% of those profes-
sional investors thought they were equal or below average at their job 
(Montier 2008). 
 
We have a similar situation here in this survey. Even in Nepal people think 
that they are above average at their job. 82% of the respondents thought 
they were above average at their job. Only 13% people thought that they 
were not above average at their job and the remaining 5% had no prefer-
ences whether they were above average at their job or not. 
 
As mentioned in the theory part above, it is a sign of overconfidence. Psy-
chologists have determined that overconfidence causes people to overes-
timate their knowledge, underestimate risks and exaggerate their ability to 
control events (Montier 2008, 99). People continue forecasting even after 
many evidences have proved that they are not good at forecasting. 
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5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter focuses on how behavioral finance can be used to overcome a 
financial crisis caused by the cognitive biased behaviour of people. 
 
Nepal is likely to have such a situation in the future. The political situation 
of the country, instead of taking a right turn, has taken a different turn. 
The country’s economy is being spent on worthless things. After the end 
of the civil war, constituent election was held under difficult conditions. It 
didn’t seem easy to hold the election but this was one critical success 
achieved after the end of the civil war. The main responsibility of the con-
stituent election was to write a new constitution because a constitution was 
needed after the end of the monarchy. But on 27th May 2012, after 4 years 
of existence, the constituent assembly was dismissed. Nepal had to bear a 
loss of almost 80 million euros. The loss occurred mainly because of the 
salaries and different bonuses given to all the 601 members of the constit-
uent assembly. They received their salaries, allowances and bonuses for 4 
years and at the end, there was no use of them being in their positions. The 
constituent assembly had to be dismissed without getting any results from 
them. Thus, instead of having political stability, Nepal is going on the path 
of instability. This indicates that there is a higher possibility of financial 
crisis in the future. Thus, there is a need for the commissioning company 
to be prepared for such situations. 
 
Some recommendations are listed and explained below about the actions, 
the commissioning company can take in order to cope with the situation of 
crisis caused by the cognitive biased behaviour of people. 
5.1 Satisfaction measurement 
One thing that can be concluded from looking at the theoretical framework 
presented above is that the behaviour of investors is not rational. It is hard 
to predict what decision the investors will make in different situations. But 
having some knowledge about the reactions to certain situations from in-
vestors, it becomes somewhat easier to formulate a work plan, than it 
would be without having any knowledge on behavioral finance. Though 
prediction is hard, sometimes under certain grounds, it may be easy to 
trace down what investors will think like. For example, with the degrading 
political situation of the country, one can easily make a guess that a finan-
cial crisis is going to strike back again. 
 
It could be observed in the interview with the management that the com-
pany lacks information on the level of customer satisfaction. There have 
never been any efforts to find out how satisfied the customers are. 
 
The most important finding in the research project was the need to meas-
ure the satisfaction level of the customers. It is necessary to know whether 
the customers are satisfied or not with the existing schemes that the com-
pany has scheduled for them. This can help the commissioning company 
to formulate new schemes that would attract customers to invest their 
capital into the company. 
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Customer satisfaction can be measured by arranging a feedback session in 
the company at regular intervals. Organizing sessions where customers 
can interact with the management committee can be conducted as the 
measurement of the satisfaction level. It is mentioned above that meetings 
were usually arranged at the company just to fill the spare time they had. 
So, sessions like this must not be of such type where it would seem that 
the company is just organizing such meetings in order to make them look 
busy and make their schedule look tight. According to the third sin of be-
havioral critique presented by James Montier, companies often call for 
such meetings because they have nothing better to do (Montier 2008, 143.) 
So such sessions should be fruitful. There should be proper implementa-
tion of strategies where required according to the suggestions of the cus-
tomers. This would make the customers think that the company actually 
listens to them and they would be more interested to invest their capital in-
to the company. They will have a feeling of security if the company can 
show them that they really care for their customers’ satisfaction.  
5.2 Up-to-date information 
It is important to update all the possible information to the investors in the 
company about any new plans or schemes that the company has applied. 
Information is the key factor that keeps motivating the customers to trust 
the company. 
 
Investors in many cases make rational decisions but biased behaviour still 
exists in them. One of the most important biased behaviours mentioned 
earlier in the theoretical part of this research process, is confirmation bias 
People have a tendency to seek for information that agrees with their exist-
ing beliefs. It is hard to make a person believe what he thinks is not the 
right thing. If the investors are kept up-to-date about the new schemes, 
plans or any information related to the company, they are less likely to 
make a story on their own. They are less likely to create a belief that will 
later act as an existing belief, which they would want a change in the sit-
uation to confirm with (Bernéus, Sandberg and Wahlbeck 2008, 7.) Keep-
ing the customers updated will give them less time to form any strong be-
liefs or opinions about any bad situations. This means they are less likely 
to have an existing belief. When they do not have any existing beliefs, 
they have nothing negative that they can confirm the information with. 
 
If the company succeeds in dealing in a proper way with the confirmation-
biased behaviour of its investors, then it is more likely it does not lose its 
existing customers. Not only that, if they are able to convince the existing 
investors, it is more likely that new investors will also be attracted towards 
investing into the company. 
 
When customers are kept up-to-date with the company information, it cre-
ates an environment where customers are satisfied with the company. The 
more satisfied they are, the more secured they feel about their investment 
in the company. 
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5.3 Information equal to knowledge 
As we have discussed above, it is crucial to provide information to the 
customers about the company time and again. But providing information 
to the customers does not mean providing them with incomplete infor-
mation or providing information in parts. 
 
In the second sin of behavioral critique, i.e. illusion of knowledge (glut-
tony), we discussed that more information is not better information and in-
formation only is not knowledge. Information is a raw form of statistics or 
data used to define a specific situation whereas knowledge is something 
that is applied to interpret information about the situation and decide how 
to handle it. (Montier 2008, 135.) 
 
We also took a look at the study made by Oskamp, (1965) about a young 
man called Joseph Kidd. In that study, he divided the information of that 
young man into four different parts and gave it to psychologists one at a 
time. We saw how the psychologists were confident about their findings 
(guess in this case) about Joseph’s behavioral patterns, attitudes, interests 
and typical reactions to real life events. There was a graph drawn of their 
accuracy drawn against their confidence. It was clear from the graph that 
they were more confident but less accurate. This was because they were 
given very little information at a time and complete information was not 
given to them at once, though the complete information was there with 
Oskamp. 
 
Thus, it is necessary to keep in mind for the company that whenever they 
have information, they do not deliver it to their customers in parts. If de-
livered in parts, customers will have had their mind made up step by step 
and the information might misinterpret the message that the company is 
trying to convey. Whenever information is to be delivered to the inves-
tors/customers of the company, it should rather be delivered in a form of 
knowledge than information. 
 
Depending upon where the current situation might lead us to and what the 
past experience has taught us, these are the suggestions that might help the 
commissioning company get out of the situation of financial crisis caused 
by behavioral change in customers. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
Panchashil Multi-Purpose Co-operative Limited (PMCL), which is a “D” 
category financial institution in Nepal, commissioned this study. The main 
purpose of this study was to use behavioral finance as a tool and to suggest 
the commissioning company different ways that can be used to overcome 
the situation created by irrational decision-making behaviour of investors 
or the company’s customers. 
 
Many models, theories and hypotheses of behavioral finance by many 
prominent researchers were used in this study to get a clearer understand-
ing on investor behavioral change after being exposed to different situa-
tions. 
 
By using such models, theories and hypotheses, questions were formulated 
which were used for two purposes, i.e. an interview with the management 
of the company and a survey with the investors of the company. Based on 
the answers provided by the management committee of the commissioning 
company and the company’s customers, the author felt a need of commu-
nication between the customers and the commissioning company. A need 
to measure the level of satisfaction amongst the customers was also no-
ticed. Keeping these needs in minds, recommendations to the commission-
ing company were listed. 
 
The political situation of Nepal, instead of getting better, is getting worse. 
Politics have been closely related to the financial ups and downs. If the 
situation continues this way, it is more probable that in the future, the 
country will reach a stage of a huge economic chaos. Of course if it is a 
severe chaotic situation, studying customers’ behavioral change in the fi-
nancial world will be of no use. But if the company, followed the sugges-
tions mentioned in this research it would help the company from getting 
lost into a financial dilemma caused by the cognitive biased behaviour of 
the investors. 
 
Taking advantage of the worse political situation, there is a probability 
that a number of bank and financial institutions will pop up which means 
that the commissioning company, PMCL will have to face a huge compe-
tition.  
 
The research clearly indicated that there is no rationality in people’s be-
havioral change. No one can predict the outcome of the financial market 
based on customer behaviour. But if the company keeps up with the rec-
ommendations mentioned above, it could be hoped that the company will 
not lose its existing customers and this might attract a number of investors 
towards the company. 
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Appendix 1 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
1. What effect did you face because of the crisis lead by the political 
situation of Nepal? 
2. Did customers in banking sector have behavioral change because 
of the political situation of the country? 
3. Did the world economic crisis have any effect on this bank? If yes, 
what? If no, why not? 
4. Did you loose customers because of the rumours in financial mar-
ket regarding high inter-banking loan? 
5. Inter-banking loan being high did affect the big banks, but were 
you able to turn this situation in your favour (being a small bank-
ing company)? Were you able to take advantage of the situation? 
6. If there was an advantage, what sort of? 
7. Do you have any tools or methods to measure behavioral change in 
customers? 
8. People’s thinking is obviously irrational and in those situations, it 
was probably negative. Did you try using any methods to convince 
them or change the irrational thinking from negative to positive? 
9. Are you prepared if the situation strikes back? 
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Appendix 2 
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
1. Your gender 
a) Male 
b) Female 
 
2. Which age group are you in? 
a) Below 25 
b) 25-30 
c) 30-35 
d) 35-40 
e) 40-45 
f) 45-50 
g) Above 50 
 
3. A coin is tossed 5 times. Each toss gave you head as a result. If you 
had to bet on the 6th toss, what would you go for? 
a) Heads 
b) Tails 
c) No preference 
 
4. There are two restaurants in front of you, one Japanese and the other 
one Chinese. You have no idea about what type of food they offer 
there and you are very hungry. There are 5 people in the Japanese res-
taurant but the Chinese one is empty. Which restaurant will you go to? 
a) Japanese 
b) Chinese 
c) No preference 
 
5. You have to choose either of the following concurrent decisions. First 
check both the choices then make a decision. 
1st decision: 
a) A sure chance to get Rs. 5000. 
b) A 30 per cent chance to get Rs. 150000 and 70 per cent chance to 
get nothing. 
2nd decision: 
c) A sure loss of Rs. 10000 
d) A 70 per cent chance to loose Rs. 200000 and 30 per cent chance 
to loose nothing 
 
6. Are you above average at your job? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) No preference 
 
 
 
 
 
